Africa : geography and growth by Paul Collier
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or the last three decades, Africa
as a whole has stagnated.
Because per capita income is
effectively constant, there is
accelerating divergence with
other developing countries.
Herein is Africa’s economic problem: diver-
gence, not poverty itself. 
For the last several years, African econom-
ic performance has improved. The largest 
single driving factor is the commodity booms.
The last time Africa had a similar phase was
the late 1970s.  After those commodity booms,
Africa crashed—the current challenge for
Africa’s leaders is not to repeat that history.  
Peace settlements generally prompt a
rebound effect after times of conflict. In
Africa, post-conflict recoveries are now
spurring rapid growth. Additionally there are
delayed—but significant—economic reforms,
which may be persistent. The best indicator of
those economic reforms is macro performance.
With the notable exception of Zimbabwe,
Africa’s macro performance is now remarkably
better than one or two decades ago.
Africa is often dismissed, as if it was 
special, odd or sad. Contrarily, Africa is intelli-
gible and understandable in terms of global
patterns. Africa is unique, both in its physical
and human geography. Given those distinctive
features, its behavior conforms to global 
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There are two pieces of Africa’s physical
geography that are characteristically impor-
tant. It is land-abundant and dirt-poor, and
therefore natural resources are crucial. They
loom large relative to other income. But the
natural resources are unevenly distributed, so
parts of Africa are resource-rich while others
are resource-scarce.  
The second distinguishing feature of
Africa is the enormity of the continent 
relative to its population. When a large area is
split into many countries, some of them will 
be landlocked.  
These two features allow analysis. If 
an area is resource-rich, it doesn’t matter
whether it is landlocked or coastal, therefore
the continent can be examined in three 
categories. The most distinctive: landlocked
and resource scarce.  
One-third of Africa’s population lives 
in landlocked resource-scarce countries. In
developing areas elsewhere, such areas have 
seldom become sovereign countries for 
good reason.
There is no plan to elevate these countries
to middle income, let alone develop them.
This would depend upon doing things like
Switzerland, Austria and Luxembourg—piggy-
backing on your neighbors’ growth. For such
countries, neighbors are not in the way of the
market—they are the market.  
To be successful, two things must happen.
The first is integration. Globally, that has hap-
pened for landlocked areas. The average coun-
try, landlocked or not, grows an additional 0.4
percent if its neighbors grow 1 percent. 
For landlocked countries excluding those 
in Africa, that spillover is 0.7 percent, while in
Africa it’s 0.2 percent.  
In other words, African landlocked coun-
tries have not integrated into their sub-region.
To date it hasn’t mattered: there hasn’t been
any growth to spill over.  
Step 1 is “fix the more fortunate 
countries.” The critical path to development 
in Africa’s landlocked resource-scarce countries
to develop is, first, growth in more 
fortunate countries.  
Let’s take the resource-rich, which make
up another one-third of Africa’s population,
compared with the 11 percent elsewhere. If
you are resource-rich, you are inevitably going
to have a big government, because resources
are going to be taxed by the government. It
then has to be spent. 
At one point the International Monetary
Fund was keen on future generations’ funds—
the Norway model.  That is crazy for Africa in
two senses. First, Africa is capital-scarce, unlike
Norway. So at some stage, Africa needs to
absorb that money in domestic capital forma-
tion, not in financial assets in New York.
Second, and more important, Africa does
not have the political institutions to defend a
future generations’ fund. In practice, a future
generations’ fund is a transfer from a rare, 
prudent finance minister to a less rare, 
not-very-prudent finance minister a few years
down the line. Future generations’ funds in
Africa are for the birds.  
Also, they are the wrong issue. Savings is a
second-order issue. The first-order issue is how
public money is spent. That is a matter of gov-
ernment accountability.  Globally, resource-
rich countries do this rather poorly. The main
mechanism for better accountability should 
be democracy.  
I’ve looked at this statistically around the
globe; resource-rich countries are distinctive.
Outside of these countries, democracy actually
accelerates growth. Within them, democracy
reduces growth. But, if you separate democra-
cy into two different components—electoral
competition, and checks and balances—elec-
toral competition is distinctively bad in the
resource-rich countries and checks and 
balances are distinctively good.  So the
resource-rich countries need a distinctive form
of democracy.  They need a lot of checks and
balances, but usually get the opposite.
In Africa, the contrast is between
Botswana and Nigeria. Botswana, although a
democracy, can’t reasonably be described as
intense electoral competition. The government
has never gone so far as to lose, but it does have
a lot of checks and balances, especially on how
money is spent.  
Nigeria is the opposite. It has had intense
electoral competition. In the last election, 80
percent of senators lost their seats and therehave been no checks and balances at all. So
democracy is undermined by resource riches,
partly because in these environments, resource
rents turn into patronage politics.
Turning to the coastal, resource-scarce
areas, globally they are countries that have
been most successful. They are the countries
that have had fast growth. That is the game
plan we really know about—the game plan
T.N. Srinivasan was talking about. Nowhere in
Africa has that happened, except Mauritius.
Something went wrong in the 1980s. There
was a window of opportunity, but for various
reasons, all of Africa’s coastal resource-scarce
economies were fouled up with poor policies
or conflict. Tony Venables says they missed the
boat because Asia has now built up these
agglomeration economies. Asia still has cheap
labor, so Africa can’t out-compete Asia on
wages, but Asia can out-compete Africa on
agglomeration economies. That is the 
physical geography.  
Let me turn to the human geography
before pulling the two together. There are two
distinctive features of African human geogra-
phy. First, political geography:  The region has
a smaller population than south Asia, but it is
divided into 44 countries.  
Small countries imply three things. Again,
I rely on global statistic relationships. If you
start with poor policy, reform is much harder if
your population is small. Africa started with
poor policy. So did India. And so did China.
Africa started no worse, but the process 
of reform requires a critical mass of educated
people, and a scale economy in having things
like a financial press, an informed media, 
and an informed society. Africa just doesn’t
have these things.  
Although its strategy was disastrous,
China had a critical mass of educated people.
The Central African Republic doesn’t. There is
nobody there with education. So the process of
reform has been long delayed. That is one fea-
ture of a small population.
Second, there is a much greater level of
insecurity. If you divided India into 44 coun-
tries, no one country would have the scale to
provide adequate internal security. The overall
regional incidence of violent conflict would go
up, which is what happened in Africa.  
The third feature of a small population is
obvious: being more prone to shocks. The
other feature of African human geography is,
despite being small, the typical country 
is radically more ethnically diverse than 
other societies.
What do we know about ethnic diversity
globally? Two things. First, collective action is
much harder and therefore the provision of
public goods is much less effective. A diverse
society should have a small state, shifting more
things into private activity.  
Second, diverse societies need democracy.
Globally, autocracy seems to be fine for
growth. Look at China. But it does not have
ethnic diversity.  
If you have autocracy and ethnic diversity,
you hit disaster, like Africa. There is a simple
economic reason for that. Splitting a society
into ethnic groups and giving autocratic
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group is fairly small, it has an overwhelming
incentive to benefit itself by redistribution
rather than by the public good of growth.
Until recently, Africa did not have democ-
racy. It had predatory, minority autocracies.
That is the human geography of Africa.
Putting together physical and human geogra-
phy points at two critical problems for Africa’s
future growth.  
The first is the resource-rich countries.
The big story at the moment in Africa is
resource riches.  Commodity prices are 
going up. Discoveries are spreading. That is the
opportunity for Africa. But, its resource riches
are in ethnically diverse societies.  
Big public sectors don’t work in ethically
diverse societies because of the collective action
problem, and the need for democracy.
Democracy and resource-rich countries don’t
work, turning patronage into politics. That is
the dilemma. You have to run a big state,
because inevitably the state has a lot of money.
But collective action for spending public
money is going to fail.  If you need to make
democracies work, impose accountability on
the government, but with resource wealth
democracy corrupts so easily into patronage
politics. Then the challenge in that case is
building accountable democracies.
To his credit, Nigerian President Obasanjo
has tried to do that during his second term.  It’s
what he started to do, putting in place checks
and balances, and it’s precisely the right agen-
da. Obviously, a hugely important check and
balance is the central bank.  In societies where
you don’t have an informed press, the central
bank is potentially the only domestic respected
authority that can deliver a message of
accountable government.  
Also, outsiders play an important role.
The British government, to its credit, launched
something called the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative, trying to get on a vol-
untary basis some basic standards of gover-
nance into managing resource rents. That is a
hugely important thing to take forward. EITI
was a modest step.  We need to scale it up. But
that is the right thing for the international
community to do to make sure that Africa’s
new wave of resource rents is more successful
than its old one. This is a growth challenge.
The other growth challenge is that Africa’s
coastal resource-scarce economies have missed
the globalization boat. We somehow have to
bring that boat back. How do we do it? If we
don’t bring it back artificially, it will come back
naturally once Asia’s wages are as high, relative
to Africa’s wages, as Europe’s wages were rela-
tive to Asia when Asia broke in. That will take
a long time.
To its credit, America actually has devel-
oped such a way—the Africa Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA). There are many
respects in which this is a flawed mechanism,
but it gets the basics right. It has a temporary
preference for Africa versus Asia in American
markets. It’s worked, raising African exports to
America by more than 50 percent.  
Europe has a supposedly similar scheme,
Everything But Arms, which is totally hope-
less. The devil with all trade agreements is in
the detail. Everything But Arms fails on all the
details. The challenge is to somewhat improve
the AGOA scheme, and in particular give it a
slightly longer horizon than it has now. 
At the moment, the critical feature of the
scheme has to be renewed annually in
Congress. A one-year horizon is too short for
investment. What I would like to see is an
AGOA-plus that is scaled up across the
Organisation for Economic Co-oporation and
Development.   
Those are the two challenges: Breaking the
growth bottleneck in the coastal resource-
scarce economies, and trying to ensure that
Africa manages the present resource boom bet-
ter than it did in the past. Africa is not a mys-
terious, sui generis-type of place.  It has distinc-
tive features, which generate two distinctive
problems, both of which the international
community has a role in resolving. 
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